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Author’s Note 
 The United States Refugee Resettlement Program has seen many changes over 
the last twenty years. However, the election of President Trump and the subsequent 
policy distortions to the program have caused the most dramatic changes. The almost 
weekly pronouncements coming out of the White House related to immigration, 
refugees, and international politics have left the program in disarray. Refugee 
arrivals to the United States have almost come to a standstill and the entire program 
has begun to unravel (Amos, 2018). The State Department’s bureau responsible for 
the US refugee resettlement program, Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), 
released its annual report to Congress on October 4, 2017, announcing the 
Presidential Determination of 45,000 total refugee arrivals for federal fiscal year (FY) 
2018. This is the lowest number of arrivals coming to the U.S. since 2001, and less 
than half of the two previous fiscal years: 110,000 in 2017, and 85,000 in 2016.1  
 The following paper focuses on this earlier time period under the Obama 
Administration, and specifically the summer of 2016 when I spent ten weeks 
completing a graduate student internship with the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP) in PRM. This experience combined with my eight plus years working 
directly with refugees in Greensboro, NC, has helped me bring a variety of 
perspectives to the topic of refugee resettlement. A lot can and should be written on 
the Trump administration’s response to the global refugee crisis and his policies 
toward resettlement. However, refugee resettlement advocates need to look at both 
the strengths and weaknesses of the program at its height of arrivals, FY 2016, in 
order to push for a stronger program when the opportunity comes.2 
 
Introduction 
The planet faces the highest levels of human displacement on record (UHNCR, 
2018). Refugee resettlement, one of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees’ (UNHCR) identified durable solutions, is a defining moral, political, and 
                                                          
1 The federal fiscal year runs October 1, to September 30 of the following calendar year. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the numbers and information are reflective of the USRAP during the months of June, July, 
August, and September 2016. 
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ideological issue of our time. The United States model of refugee resettlement is 
considered an exemplar model internationally (Bartlett, 2015). Under the Obama 
Administration, from FY 2009 to FY 2016 over 611,000 refugees were resettled in the 
U.S. (Migration Policy Institute, 2017). In the last full fiscal year under President 
Obama, 85,000 refugees were resettled in different parts of the country. This is the 
most since 1996, and the largest number of refugees resettled in any country via 
UNHCR’s formal resettlement mechanism. Under the State Department’s Bureau of 
Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), the United States Refugee Admissions 
Program (USRAP) is a public/private partnership working with multiple federal 
agencies, state and local governments, as well as national non-profits. In FY 2016, 
refugees were resettled in 49 of the 50 states, including Alaska and Hawaii. Despite 
the broad successes of the USRAP over the last eight years, opportunities to 
strengthen and improve outcomes for refugees do exist. Exploring the relationships 
between the multiple systems and agencies involved reveals opportunities for growth 
and improvement.   
The Peace and Conflict Studies practice of conflict mapping (Wehr, 1979) 
provides a first step to manage a particular conflict and provides a roadmap to 
understanding the origins, nature, dynamics, and possibilities for interventions. The 
basic notion of conflict mapping provides a useful tool for untangling the program, 
understanding the dynamics between agencies, and identifying points of 
intervention. Also from the social science field, an asset-based approach builds on the 
strengths and capabilities of individuals, associations, and institutions that exist 
within a given system (Kretzmann, 1993). Asset-based approaches are people-
centered. It is important to identify what is working well in the USRAP, to build on 
those strengths, and put refugees at the center. This paper will explain USRAP’s 
structure and relationships with specific partners from PRM’s perspective, build a 
USRAP “conflict map,” identify recent, successful changes, and put forward 
additional recommendations.  
Beginning with an overview, the first section will describe program 
fundamentals. The following section examines the cooperative agreement, a 
contractual arrangement between PRM and the resettlement agencies. Developing 
our USRAP “conflict map,” the next six sections explore the dynamics between the 
stakeholders critical to the success of the overall program including: the resettlement 
agencies, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, the White House, Congress, State 
Governments, and local receiving communities. The following section identifies 
recent successful PRM-initiated program improvements. Using the conflict map 
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diagrams found in Figure I, the last section puts forward additional recommendations 
to strengthen and improve the program to give agency back to refugees and put them 
at the center of the program. 
 
Overview: The U.S. Refugee Assistance Program  
Over the last forty years, the United States has resettled over three million 
people, the largest number of refugees worldwide (Bartlett, 2015). As a public/private 
partnership, USRAP operates through a multi-layered, multi-agency, and often 
multi-year process to prioritize the most vulnerable families and individuals 
requiring resettlement, while ensuring U.S. security and foreign interests. Funding 
from Congress for USRAP traditionally goes to three federal agencies: (1) The 
Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS); (2) The Department of State/Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); 
and (3) The Department of Health and Human Services/Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR). Despite the involvement of other agencies, PRM manages the 
program including the overseas process of USRAP and the initial 90-day Reception 
and Placement (R&P) program of the refugee experience in the U.S. The overseas 
arm of USRAP works with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), other non-governmental agencies, and host nations in eight countries to 
oversee and coordinate Refugee Support Centers (RSCs). Much of the overseas 
refugee security screening and approval process happens in, or is coordinated from, 
these centers. On the domestic side of USRAP, PRM contracts with nine U.S. based 
national non-profits to sponsor refugees for resettlement to the U.S. This paper will 
focus on the domestic side of the USRAP.  
 
USRAP - Reception & Placement Program 
The Department of State annually signs cooperative agreements with nine 
domestic resettlement agencies (RA) outlining required services of the Reception and 
Placement (R&P) Program (Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017). Each 
of the nine resettlement agencies (RAs) has a different model. They all include a 
headquarters or central office, but have different relationships with their nationwide 
network of local or affiliate offices. There are a total of 309 affiliates in 180 locations 
across 48 states (Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017). The largest RA 
in both number of refugees resettled and number of affiliate offices, The United States 
Council of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), has a model where each office operates 
independently from the Council. USCCB maintains legal and fiscal relationships 
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through the R&P program, but has no oversight of other programs provided at those 
offices. In contrast, at the International Rescue Committee (IRC), each local office is 
an extension of their main branch. Differences in organizational models contribute to 
variation in service provision for refugees. However, PRM provides uniform 
expectations for the services that each refugee receives in the cooperative agreement 
(Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017).  
PRM staff view the cooperative agreement as a strong, valuable document 
providing critical guidance to resettlement agencies (PRM Staff member, personal 
communication, June, 2016). When adhered to by agencies and their staff, coupled 
with sufficient Office of Refugee Resettlement funding, refugees can be on a path 
toward self-sufficiency at the end of the 90-day R&P period (PRM Staff member, 
personal communication, June, 2016). However, rising costs of housing and other 
living expenses nationally, coupled with stagnant job wages in some regions of the 
country makes self-sufficiency for refugees even more challenging.  
Expectations of initial and core services outlined in the cooperative agreement 
include: providing safe, sanitary, and affordable housing; essential furnishings, 
appropriate food, food allowances, other basic necessities such as household items; 
assistance obtaining health screenings and other necessary health and mental health 
services; assistance applying for social security cards; assistance obtaining applicable 
social service benefits; assistance enrolling in English language instruction; 
assistance enrolling in employment services; and assistance registering children in 
school (U.S Department of State Award Provisions, Reception & Placement 
Cooperative Agreement FY 2016). Agencies are expected to provide these services 
within thirty to ninety days after arrival.   
PRM regularly monitors both HQs and local affiliates (U.S Department of 
State Award Provisions, Reception & Placement Cooperative Agreement FY 2016). 
During an on-site inspection PRM determines how well the agency is complying with 
the cooperative agreement. This includes examining client case files, talking with 
staff, and conducting home visits to speak with refugees (PRM Staff member, 
personal communication, June-July, 2016). In addition to PRM monitoring, 
headquarters are also required by the cooperative agreement to monitor their 
affiliates. As each resettlement agency has a different organizational structure, they 
also monitor differently. Often, HQs monitor to ensure receiving communities have 
interpreters in applicable languages, housing options remain safe and affordable, 
schools are equipped to work with large numbers of English language learning 
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students, and cities/towns can accommodate special medical, or other special needs 
(PRM Staff member, personal communication, June-July, 2016). 
 
Challenges with the Cooperative Agreement 
In practice, there are difficulties in reaching the goals of the cooperative 
agreement. Adhering to the strict timelines outlined in the agreement can be 
challenging for a variety of reasons. Large numbers of refugee arrivals in a short 
amount of time makes it increasingly difficult for affiliate staff to meet the deadlines. 
In the last few years, up until January 2017, the last quarter of each fiscal year 
brought large numbers of arrivals. Sometimes between 50% and 75% of the total 
number for the year would arrive in those last couple of months (M. Mayers, NC State 
Refugee Advisor Meeting, September, 2016 & 2015). This can overwhelm small or 
even larger communities. Finding adequate housing in a timely manner is extremely 
difficult and keeping up with multiple family appointment schedules adds strain for 
resettlement staff. Lastly, this “surge” as it’s known in the resettlement community, 
can put enormous pressure on local resources such as the county health departments 
that conduct all initial refugee health screenings, delaying critical follow-up doctor 
visits for two, three or four months after arrival (NC State Refugee Advisor Meeting, 
September, 2016 & 2015).   
Doubly challenging is that other entities of federal, state, and local 
governments manage many of the required programs and benefits in which refugees 
need to be enrolled (Greensboro, NC resettlement agency affiliate staff, quarterly 
community consultation, September 2016).  PRM’s financial support for refugees ends 
after 90 days. Throughout the initial ninety days and after, the Department of Health 
and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR) provides support to 
eligible refugees through time-limited assistance programs (up to eight months from 
arrival) and social and employment service programs (up to five years) (Proposed 
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017). Funding comes from the federal level 
through ORR, but the state Health and Human Service Departments administer 
some benefits and services. For example, refugees are eligible for a unique Medicaid 
program during their initial eight months. However, sometimes the cards arrive two 
to three months after the client has been enrolled making it challenging to access 
both initial and specialty medical care. Children need to go through immunizations 
prior to school enrollment, but do not have access if local health departments are 
backed up or Medicaid cards have not arrived (Greensboro, NC resettlement agency 
affiliate staff, quarterly community consultation, September 2016). 
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PRM’s Relationship with Resettlement Agencies: Headquarters and local 
affiliates  
PRM has built strong relationships with each of the nine-resettlement 
agencies. Under the Admissions Director, three program officers divide oversight 
responsibility of the nine-resettlement cooperative agreements and one technical 
assistance program. In the summer of 2016, the program officers were in almost daily 
communication with each resettlement agency under their purview: answering staff 
questions, soliciting information, and managing arrivals. In addition to these day-to-
day workings, the Admissions office seeks input into the program and provides 
support to resettlement agencies throughout the year via several topic-specific 
working-groups, an annual Admissions workshop, and quarterly R&P meetings in 
DC, where staff from each resettlement agency can provide input to the program. 
PRM staff also discuss more complex processes such as the national refugee allocation 
system with resettlement agencies in order to strengthen them (E. Biddle, internship 
experience, June-September, 2016). The almost daily contacts, working groups, and 
the topic-specific workshops create a collaborative atmosphere in administering 
resettlement. 
However, USRAP is built on a funder/recipient dynamic between PRM and 
each resettlement agency. PRM is ultimately accountable to Congress, the White 
House, and to being a good steward of public dollars, a position sometimes in conflict 
with the interests of the resettlement agencies or even refugees. This tension is clear 
through PRM’s conversations and ultimately what they decide to fund (E. Biddle, 
internship experience, June-September, 2016). Throughout the Notice of Funding 
Availability (NOFA) process for the 2017 R&P Program year, PRM staff prioritized 
applications in which the applicant provided well-thought out, detailed responses 
connecting the budget with the proposed programming and staff to ensure each dollar 
was well spent (Admissions staff, NOFA 2017 application process, June-July 2016).   
Additionally, the funder/recipient model can create inherent competition 
between the agencies as they seek to secure limited federal dollars. At the end of the 
three-month long application review process, PRM ranks the agency applications by 
score. The final score for each is combined from staff scores, an external panel’s score, 
and compiled data from the last couple monitoring visits completed by both the HQ 
and PRM (Admissions staff, NOFA 2017 application process, June-August 2016). The 
resettlement agencies that earn the highest ratings receive proportionately more 
funding and more slots for refugees. Those with the lowest ratings receive a potential 
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decrease in funds and in slots for refugees. The applicants receive their score, are told 
the top and bottom scores, excluding the name of the agencies in order to see the full 
range of scores (Admissions staff, NOFA 2017 application process, June-July 2016). 
While PRM does appreciate collaborative efforts, ultimately, one agency’s success in 
their application means more funding for them and less for others. 
 
PRM’s Relationship with the Office of Refugee Resettlement  
As the two main federal agencies administering USRAP, the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) and PRM have a complex relationship. While their work is 
intertwined, their program goals and desired outcomes for refugees differ. PRM 
administers the overseas processing and the fist 90-day R&P program. ORR 
administers employment, social services, health access, and additional technical 
assistance programs. The distinction between the agencies is often confusing for 
anyone not deep in the resettlement world, including refugees. Staff between the two 
connect on a monthly call, and leadership connect as often as needed in order to be 
on the same page (E. Biddle, internship experience, June-September, 2016). However, 
dynamics and tension exists. When both directors are in the same meeting, the PRM 
Director speaks first, chairs and ultimately makes final decisions (E. Biddle, 
internship experience, June-September, 2016). In the monthly call coordinated by 
PRM, PRM sets the agenda and leads the call (PRM & ORR conference call, July 28, 
2016). During the NOFA process for FY17, the RAs were encouraged to submit 
proposals for new R&P sites. New resettlement sites directly affect ORR’s funding. 
In August, PRM shared the list of potential new sites; however, ORR had minimal to 
no input regarding which sites would be approved (PRM & ORR conference call, July 
28, 2016).  
 
PRM’s Relationship with The White House 
PRM’s relationship with the White House depends on a variety of factors, 
including who is in office. PRM staff shared that under the Obama administration, 
much to their surprise, the White House was more involved with the nuts and bolts 
of USRAP than previous administrations, even before refugee resettlement became 
part of the national discourse (PRM staff member, personal communication, July 15, 
2016). PRM regularly submits reports and recommendations to the White House to 
influence policy. However, at high-level meetings in which critical policy decisions are 
made, such as the numbers of arrivals in the coming FY, the State Department 
representatives are often far removed from the day-to-day workings of USRAP and 
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those who know the program best provide only a one-to-two-page policy brief (PRM 
staff member, personal communication, August 15, 2016).  
A major tension between the political needs of the White House and the 
practical needs of PRM Admission staff during the summer of 2016 was the rapid 
increase of refugee arrivals (PRM staff member, personal communication, August 15, 
2016). Staff at PRM with years of expertise support modest, intentional increases to 
the number of arrivals. Before the Presidential Determination for FY17 was 
announced in September, PRM staff were concerned that the White House would 
push for 120,000 or 130,000, a significant jump from 85,000 in FY 17, putting 
additional stress on the program (PRM staff member, personal communication, July 
15, 2016). The goal of the final 110,000 (Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 
2017) was still ambitious for its time. 
 
PRM’s Relationship with Congress 
PRM has a different relationship with Congress. PRM frequently participates 
in briefing calls and in person visits with Congressional members and their staffers, 
to share updates regarding programs and answer Congress members’ questions (PRM 
staff member, personal communications, August 3, 2016). One PRM staff member 
serves as the main Congressional Liaison for the Bureau. It is her job to track pieces 
of legislation and elected officials’ public statements that impact PRM’s work, while 
also fielding individual requests for information from congressional offices (E. Biddle, 
internship experience, June-September, 2016). Each Fall, the State Department 
submits a report to Congress outlining the current global refugee situation and plans 
for the coming FY. Through this process of accountability and consultation, Congress 
approves the State Department’s budget (Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal 
Year 2017). In the fall of 2016, there was a stark gap between the admissions ceiling 
of 110,000 for refugees for FY17 and both PRM and ORR’s budget (Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017). This divergence between funds and arrival 
numbers impacts refugees, agencies, and receiving communities alike (E. Biddle, 
internship experience, June-September, 2016).  
 
PRM’s Relationship with State Governments 
State governments have a unique intersection with PRM. Under the Refugee 
Act of 1980, the Federal government is required to, “consult regularly with States, 
localities and private nonprofit voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship 
process and the intended distribution of refugees” (Title III Sec. 301(c)(1) of the 
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Refugee Act of 1980). States that receive refugees may have a governor-appointed 
State Refugee Coordinator (SRC), if not a non-profit operates the State Refugee Office 
(SRO) through an alternative mechanism known as a Wilson-Fish program. The SRO 
administers ORR funded resettlement programs including cash assistance (cash & 
medical) and Social Security to refugees. As of January 2017, there were thirteen 
Wilson-Fish programs operating in twelve states (“Office of Refugee Resettlement,” 
2017). During the annual R&P proposal process, the SRC makes recommendations to 
PRM regarding location and number of refugees coming to their state, often in 
consultation with the resettlement agencies in their state and the state governor. 
After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, public sentiments 
toward refugees shifted. In reaction to this, thirty-one sitting governors signed a 
letter asking the Federal Government to halt the resettlement of Syrian refugees 
until further security measures could be put in place (Fantz, 2015). Because USRAP 
is a federal program, state and local governments have neither the power nor 
authority to entirely stop refugees from being resettled in their state, however, states 
can choose to withdraw, often resulting in a Wilson-Fish program (Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017).   
Another time SROs had a critical relationship with PRM occurred during the 
second half of FY 2016. PRM sets a total number of refugees resettled in each state 
at the beginning of the FY based on the Presidential Determination and previous 
capacity of the state. PRM cannot go 10% over that number without the SRO’s 
permission (PRM Staff member, personal communications, August, 2016). As 
previously mentioned, in the last several years, the final quarter of the fiscal year has 
meant large numbers of new arrivals. As more and more states get close to 110% of 
their total arrival number, it puts stress on the entire national allocation process 
(PRM Staff member, personal communications, August, 2016). Pressured from the 
Obama Administration at the end of FY17, PRM needed to reach a record setting 
refugee arrival goal. Once a SRO said “no, more,” PRM had to redirect refugees to 
other states, thus rebooking flights and in September potentially rebooking them to 
the new fiscal year, making it harder for PRM to reach its goal (PRM Staff member, 
personal communications, August, 2016). 
 
PRM’s Relationship with Local Receiving Communities 
For many small U.S. cities with declining economies and aging populations, 
resettling able-bodied refugees has increased the overall workforce (Admissions staff, 
NOFA 2017 application process, June-August 2016). In some regions however, an 
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influx of refugees with differing cultural, linguistic, and religious practices from the 
local populace has brought friction. Established and prospective resettlement sites 
are required to conduct quarterly community consultations (Reception and Placement 
Program Cooperative Agreement, unsigned version). PRM emphasizes the 
importance of these consultations through monitoring visits, questions in the NOFA, 
and regular communication with resettlement agencies (E. Biddle, internship 
experience, June-September, 2016). Procedures and outcomes of community 
consultations vary widely across the U.S. Leading up to the summer of 2016, refugee 
resettlement, and resettlement of Syrians in particular, were being discussed 
publicly, locally, and nationally like never before. Resettlement agencies hoping to 
open sites from places like Burlington, Vermont, to Asheville, North Carolina meet 
unexpected resistance. The long-term mayor of Rutland, Vermont was defeated in re-
election, he says, due to his support for brining Syrian and Iraqi refugees to his city 
(Ring, 2017). The liberal city of Asheville, NC felt significant push back from its more 
conservative leaning county neighbor (Walton, 2016). 
 
Recent Changes to the Program 
The preceding sections untangle the USRAP program to provide an account of 
the dynamics between the various stakeholders and to highlight opportunities to 
improve and strengthen it. The following section identifies some recent, successful 
changes to the program. Using an asset based approach (Kretzmann, 1993), 
identifying and building upon what works well will lead to further improvements and 
increased agency for refugees. 
Since the 1980 Refugee Act passed, the fundamentals of USRAP have not 
shifted. The program continues to emphasize economic self-sufficiency within a time-
limited window as the main priority. However, small changes in how program policies 
are interpreted have led to significant outcomes. Those at the federal level, who have 
worked with the program for a while, argue that small, steady changes have a larger 
impact (PRM Staff member, personal communication, July 2016). Attempting to 
make sweeping, rushed policy development or implementation can have unforeseen 
negative consequences for those the program serves (PRM Staff member, personal 
communication, July, 2016).    
There has been a small but important change in how PRM describes and 
measures “self-sufficiency.” PRM considers many paths toward self-sufficiency. The 
focus has shifted from having case managers tell clients critical information such as 
how to take the bus or schedule doctors’ appointments, to requiring that refugees 
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demonstrate understanding of this knowledge, skill, and behavior. PRM has changed 
the monitoring forms from: “did case managers provide the information to refugees?” 
to “can refugees demonstrate they have acquired the skill set and knowledge to put 
them on the path of self-sufficiency?,” and “can refugees identify sources of household 
income and expenses after R&P assistance ends?”  (Reception & Placement Program 
Period Report. PRM Internal document, September, 2016)” The official PRM funded 
cultural orientation, curriculum, and assessments has been revised to incorporate 
these changes (PRM Staff member, personal communications, July, 2016). PRM has 
seen shifts in affiliate, and case manager performance, and refugee outcomes improve 
from these changes (PRM Staff member, personal communications, July, 2016). 
Another way PRM encourages case managers to think about the service they 
provide and the impact on refugees was reflected in the NOFA for the FY17 R&P 
Program. Agencies responded to a new question: “Analyze the risks and challenges 
posed by gender dynamics to R&P Program implementation” and “how [they] will 
manage these risks and ensure that R&P services are fully accessible to vulnerable 
individuals” (Notice of Funding Availability for the Reception and Placement 
Program FY 2017). PRM staff want responders to first acknowledge the need to 
examine their own implicit biases regarding gender, then explore how those biases 
effects service delivery and programs (PRM Staff member, NOFA external panel 
review, June 27th-July 1st, 2016). For example, when providing services to a couple, 
even if the husband speaks English, it is critical to ensure there is an interpreter for 
the wife. 
While the structure of the R&P funding is set-up so those who perform well are 
rewarded proportionally, PRM strives to support and promote collaboration between 
the agencies (PRM Staff member, NOFA external panel review, June 27th-July 1st, 
2016). In the NOFA cycle for FY 2017, two resettlement agencies’ proposals included 
developing new technical assistance programs focused on housing, and agency and 
client security. PRM approved their requests, as long as the programs had a national 
focus and benefited all resettlement agencies. Another example includes 
communications between the agencies regarding new resettlement sites. With the 
Obama Administration increasing the number of arrivals so quickly over a three-year 
period, the national network needed to expand. In one room at the PRM office, each 
agency stuck post-it-notes all over a U.S. map designating cities or parts of states 
they were considering for new sites. Resettlement agencies avoided duplications and 
PRM emphasized sites no one was considering. For the first attempt at something 
like this, PRM staff believe it was successful in encouraging cooperation (PRM Staff 
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member, NOFA external panel review, June 27th-July 1st, 2016). Lastly, PRM 
brought together staff from all the resettlement agencies, ORR, and other groups for 
a day-long workshop exploring how to improve refugee employment outcomes, led by 
the Stanford Immigration Policy Lab (PRM Research Day, August 30, 2016). 
 
Recommendations to improve USRAP  
In addition to the above descriptions, Figure I, located in appendix I, is an 
organizational map of the current USRAP program. Exploring a visual model helps 
to complicate the program (and its many relationships) and provide more 
opportunities for interventions. Colored arrows indicate which direction 
accountability flows and the strength of the connection between the entities. The 
USRAP is like other traditional funding models where both funding and decisions 
stem from the top. While they are influenced by a variety of voices, ultimately 
accountability resides with the source of the funding, in this case, Congress. For a 
program that seeks to benefit refugees and ultimately changes their lives, there are 
currently minimal mechanisms to solicit feedback from refugee beneficiaries. As a 
requirement of cooperative agreement, PRM conducts home visits to refugees 
(Reception & Placement Program Cooperative Agreement). During this often-three-
hour visit, monitors explore the individual or family’s resettlement experience and 
ensure cooperative agreement compliance by agency staff. There are limitations, 
however, to refugees having input during this visit. The agency selects the family and 
provides the interpreter. This does not allow refugees to be key to the process of 
accountability. 
The map and descriptions of relationships provides a big picture of USRAP, 
allowing individuals and agencies to get out of their institutional perspectives. In a 
2005 Migration Policy Institute book examining USRAP, those interviewed for the 
book: 
Revealed that even some persons deeply involved and expert in certain parts 
of the  [USRAP] may have only a dim conception of other key elements. Occasionally, 
 affirmative mis-understandings about what goes on in another part of the 
process have  led to operational confusion, exaggerated expectations, or even 
anger or accusations of  bad faith. A modest measure of operational improvement 
could be achieved simply by  assuring that persons who play key roles in any part 
of the process are trained or briefed  on the operations of the other actors and the 
constrains they face (p 5). 
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When agencies and individuals have a bigger picture, it can lead to more effective 
communication, better understanding, and an overall common purpose (Lederach, 
1996).  
PRM can continue to cultivate and encourage resettlement agencies and their 
staff to identify their personal biases and how those biases affect service delivery. In 
addition to making changes in the NOFA, PRM can add in biases related questions 
in the monitoring evaluation. A Greensboro, North Carolina, Church World Service 
affiliate (one of the nine Ras), used data to examine their own biases and evaluate 
their service delivery. Staff compiled data on the number of interactions and points 
of contact they had with each client over the course of several months (S. Ivory, 
Refugee Service Provider Meeting, March, 2015). Staff saw trends in who they spent 
more time serving, revealing that certain population groups had higher rates of 
contact with staff than others due to perceived needs rather than actual needs, 
creating an inequity in service delivery. Staff adjusted service delivery practices and 
became more proactive when working with specific population groups.   
In addition to identifying staff biases, data can be used to examine other 
refugee outcomes. The Stanford Immigration Policy Lab sought out the relationship 
between PRM and resettlement agencies to connect agency data with refugee 
outcomes. University partnerships such as this one can continue to improve the 
program. Research comparing models of resettlement would benefit the program 
nationally. Faculty and students can bring energy, much needed resources, and 
provide support over longitudinal periods to overworked resettlement agencies to 
have bigger impacts and develop evidenced based practices. 
Bigger changes include increasing funding both for initial refugee support and 
refugee resettlement agencies. PRM has been able to annually increase the amount 
of monetary assistance to individual refugees via the cooperative agreement, 
however, PRM & ORR readily admit that funding for the programs has not kept pace 
with other economic conditions making it harder and harder for refugees to resettle 
to parts of the U.S. with high or even moderate costs of living (PRM Staff member, 
personal communications, June, 2016). Increasing funding to resettlement agencies 
as well would also strongly benefit the program. 
Next, passing legislation that supports creative refugee integration models and 
allows for support for refugees over a longer timeline could have significant impacts. 
Such models could incorporate strengths from other resettlement countries including 
Canada and Australia that utilize public/private partnerships. For example, in 2016 
the advocacy group, Refugee Council USA (RCUSA) advocated for a private 
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citizenship model of resettlement to complement the current agency-based model 
(RCUSA, personal communication, August, 2016). 
Lastly, policy and culture shifts that address the entire U.S. welfare system 
need to happen. Making significant changes to the entire U.S. welfare system would 
not only impact refugees, many of whom begin in the U.S. receiving public benefits, 
but would benefit other low-income Americans. A significant number of refugees end 
up in situations similar to other low-income Americans, fighting off poverty. Refugees 
enter a workforce with stagnant wages, are resettled into shoddy housing, and face 
challenges navigating a complex and ever-changing U.S. healthcare system. Putting 
recipients at the front of the programs and making it easier to access benefits would 
be good places to start.   
 
Conclusion 
 The United States model of refugee resettlement is considered an exemplary 
model internationally (Bartlett, 2015). Over one million people have been resettled in 
the U.S. since the Refugee Law of 1980 passed, providing an escape valve for the 
ongoing global migration crisis. Currently, 1 in 113 people worldwide have been 
forcibly displaced (UNHCR, 2018). Forced migration can cause further violence and 
destabilization in their regions (UNHCR, 2018). This crisis is not going away. Almost 
40 years after the USRAP program began, we still have a moral and pragmatic 
obligation not only to continue to resettle refugees but to strengthen and reshape the 
model. In a recent speech Filippo Grandi the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees highlighted the growing trends of people being violently forced from their 
homes and into refugee situations. He pushed for increasing resettlement numbers: 
“[a]nd we should not forget that refugee resettlement is an important solution. Close 
to 1.2 million refugees need resettling globally. It is therefore an issue of major 
concern that fewer than 100,000 resettlement places [worldwide] are expected to be 
available this year - a drop of 43 percent from 2016.” The U.S. can continue to be a 
guiding model of refugee resettlement. Refugees continue to integrate into our 
communities and strengthen the entire U.S. fabric. The U.S. can lead the way in 
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Figure I- Organizational Map 
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